Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60f00889afd92306…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.3 KB Created: 2021-07-05 17:09:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 36b724093b79d17572f965923358147f SHA-1: 4e6872e9c4d3581cff7b363ad7557d9ff85b63cc SHA-256: 60f00889afd9230669d950c6638bdf07e70df16840bd800fab24f6d948abd05f
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document exhibits multiple indicators of malicious intent, including a high ML classifier score and ClamAV detection as a phishing trojan. It employs social engineering tactics by presenting a visual download button and luring the user to install a browser extension or update. The document also contains numerous links to disposable hosting and compromised CMS upload storage, suggesting it is part of a larger phishing or malware distribution infrastructure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://allytemp.ru/uplcv?utm_term=chrome+for+android+tv+apk+download
    • https://www.hediyevideo.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b567447a955---xadamidusuda.pdf
    • http://www.iamgoingto1996.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d5a7c08b547---vitetivakuvevikuwuluw.pdf
    • http://lowry-averyreunion.com/clients/c/c0/c0e4e7922159a76f956c19110b7bfeb7/File/jesikusenorabevuxudeb.pdf
    • http://111-orte.de/testarea/cwsCMSlight/media/files/xifemuwusibugiko.pdf
    • http://mottaing.eu/userfiles/files/xibipapijavilum.pdf
    • https://southtours.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/l66i35ge7rvfkerrj9pikbjfqu/miputivikuzef.pdf
    • http://training-solutions.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ce079222e6f---wulemizigono.pdf
    • https://chp-travel.ir/data/file/tizifadajuvulugupedok.pdf
    • http://mountmedpharmacy.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607ca4161bea3---49047236422.pdf
    • https://reflexlighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ab48225196222466a6d245d46b79115b/47292178819.pdf
    • https://mikepromedia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7tei7d7cf3os21vm039ncnn6g6/92518801021.pdf
    • http://wakingbeauty.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d8f4447435d---70083177828.pdf
    • http://dientrotiendathc.com/media/ftp/file/sagawugedelonoz.pdf
    • http://dijladentalcenter-qa.com/userfiles/file/betog.pdf
    • http://antwerp-reefer-tournament.be/argt/files/47521083409.pdf
    • https://ventadeterrenosurbanos.com/userfiles/file/tukif.pdf
    • https://publicbridge.pl/userfiles/file/52081947192.pdf
    • https://sipare.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7kkv8nbh0iq39c5n30vg77pep0/matomeguwi.pdf
    • http://josephlillianmorrisfamily.com/clients/59960/File/54338430663.pdf
    • https://spencershaulageltd.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c55297b20b5eafdf0a1817037a2b8c99/sirasunulokixep.pdf
    • http://global-poseg.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b7032b1996---fepakovepokodoxofegokapuw.pdf
    • https://detectiveoffice.net/userfiles/file/vagenunisixosijapemabe.pdf
    • http://xn--b1ahhafccpgkb2bxo.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a45cf9d52a23b921260f87b389a2d522/jepizodalosowuliwulovo.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e282.bin
1ecbcd85fafaad2defec7367cdd88a738be28fdcbf090b3705927f5ec8e3f6d0
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE282 10868 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fb7c.bin
f2bf4818fbc96874fe7e6fd8f6d71100d8a5761acb1f056a151b5a76d309634c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFB7C 17032 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000127e8.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x127E8 16792 bytes