Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60ce7c5743d5aa53…

MALICIOUS

RTF

18.9 KB First seen: 2020-07-24
MD5: b18154554010987ba334b643418994fc SHA-1: 582deb49f5c502441c967c5ff294c72f8eed2686 SHA-256: 60ce7c5743d5aa5319e0e335f8369bdb61ca226c436ea7333f9718a514949327
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE object data and triggers an ".objupdate" event, indicating it is designed to activate embedded objects. Heuristics specifically flag the use of Equation Editor with a split ProgID and OLE object, a known method for exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2017-11882. This exploitation likely leads to the execution of a second-stage payload, as suggested by the embedded OLE object.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014f9.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14F9 2127 bytes
SHA-256: 751bf8b468da8a7f633d6fc91a9290e729c885ccaaa8f8e269d446cdd0e95b87

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