Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Heuristics 9

• TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
  PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
• Invisible/repeated PDF links deliver payload file critical PDF_REPEATED_PAYLOAD_LINK_LURE
  PDF uses invisible link annotations and points to a direct payload download. Repeated invisible links or lure-like payload names such as document/unlock/verify archives match malware-delivery PDF carriers where the page is only a prompt and the real payload is fetched from the linked URL.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• PDF links to document-phishing landing path high PDF_DOCUMENT_PHISHING_LINK
  PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action to a non-reputable host using a document-phishing landing path such as wp-admin/wp-admin-like staging, project/folder/rfq index.php routes, repeated slm2 paths, or a heavily percent-encoded symbol slug. This destination shape is common in fake secure-document and signing lures even when the visible lure text is rasterized or font-encoded.
• Image-only PDF lure links through URL shortener high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_SHORTENER_LINK
  PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action points to a URL shortener. This is a high-confidence credential-phishing carrier shape: the visible page is a screenshot-like prompt while the destination is hidden behind redirect infrastructure.
• Image-only PDF lure links to a brand-impersonating path on an unrelated host high PDF_IMAGE_LURE_BRAND_PATH_LINK
  PDF is image-heavy with little real text and its clickable action targets a URL carrying a brand name ('adobe') as a path segment on a host that does not belong to that brand and is not known-good (e.g. 'sodecoperu.com/Docusign/index.php'). This is the credential-phishing carrier shape where a compromised or unrelated host serves a brand-named phishing kit behind a screenshot-like lure page. Distinct from the typosquat-host rule: here the host is honest-looking but the brand lives in the path.
• Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
  PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 187 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL http://www.mumbasagluna.ga/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/.site1/~public_html/_geoZone/-favicon/index.aspx/.CroxHM92.csp&98G&OutLk.jsp.php?url=https://mail.outlook.com?svr=02872 In PDF document text

  • http://yukikondo.jp/wp-admin/pdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • https://fsdressbd.com/js/adobe_pdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://jagdambadigital.com/wp-includes/Adobe/form/index.htmlIn PDF document text
  • http://gyansthalibhadeja.org/images/includes/pdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://www.mlsi.org/cp-west/NAVER/pdfview/index.htmlIn PDF document text
  • http://govino2017.govino.com.au/trade/A/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://www.smkn1muaraenim.sch.id/link/go/BestPdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://smkn1muaraenim.sch.id/link/go/BestPdf/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://parkerg8.5gbfree.com/iiiiiii/index.phpIn PDF document text
  • http://www.radpdf.comIn PDF document text
  • http://www.radpdf.com)/Author(SecuredIn PDF document text
  • http://www.dynaforms.comIn PDF document text
  • http://ow.ly/f23930eQ1U3In PDF document text
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/ctfontshttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn PDF document text
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/typography/fonts/default.aspxIn PDF document text
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0XIn PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0In PDF document text
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0TIn PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0aIn PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0In PDF document text
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@In PDF document text
  • http://www.microsoft.com/Typography/0In PDF document text

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