Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60b24a86a74246c1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

72.3 KB First seen: 2023-01-20
MD5: ddc3772ed8a0982ff34d06bd29775d73 SHA-1: fc52edea3dc36aaf8e506fec482c116c59b3b3ab SHA-256: 60b24a86a74246c1d9b73e280c71ee8729b9a57960dc3e4b196bbec2ec0daa38
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, and uses an \objupdate directive to force activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common technique to bypass macro security settings. This strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely related to the Equation Editor, to execute a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000059cd.bin
5d5ab604706abb1848660b657398a53b4db7c3a2b1b4e268b6219ca85636c9a9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x59CD 1379 bytes