Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 60871c0baf919256…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.55 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-26
MD5: 86984510bcb877b4f0a01fc0bb9641af SHA-1: 4b646d426a2e34b9df8bcf471bba6fa6d0e862c0 SHA-256: 60871c0baf919256971f8e03a23a9879dd5febefe3f70a19b2086004b7c32d33
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a PDF with a direct link to a payload at https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques, indicating a sophisticated attempt to deliver a secondary stage. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting the primary malicious functionality is within the OLE object and the embedded PDF.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
f9c8538f280ab085bf264466efa169babd2103fb849cfdd7d978c75ecabc0b4d		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0010CA79/OlE10NATiVe 1230 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00007f7d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7F7D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009d95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9D95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
e78f16cea6a27a9c629edafa866632fd927fa8d4349b092e5929a405fd56732c		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1617920 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
fe4b67bfe3276afc7ed37ec85dd994e87731c24687bdd1c4889170b2c39931bb		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1597440 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
11ecfdae3635e57dfc458f2b8f7128d319b17f0290d1a7ccc9df9160a0d7b6fa		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1563648 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00023e00.pdf
1bde125e929e4e06a9ef7e4dbb3c6818fa125a13ef9176dd584401eae878985b		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x23E00 1475584 bytes

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