Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6085e92697eb1b9c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

37.5 KB First seen: 2023-05-15
MD5: 46100be91814d075b6e93be8e2cb5a1c SHA-1: 7b41fb51d1d44a297070268ab446330c382f93bb SHA-256: 6085e92697eb1b9c14cec9928f37d92134d19c285098bda21f59e6c02723318f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with an Equation Editor ProgID, and uses \objupdate to force activation, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability like CVE-2017-11882. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers. No scripts were extracted, but the combination of heuristics strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000527a.bin
287597a360abb908063e3c713c08fff28fcae5a3086abacdb03520c875dc17d1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x527A 1572 bytes