Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 607ebddaa355981f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-10-25 22:59:30 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 9f453f93d4d81fb960e4d056500234f3 SHA-1: eb3fd77235ca415652676907e2eec1f0c2858f7c SHA-256: 607ebddaa355981f55709d7db575b22f1aa3b8e899b8836b0fab6de95d7296cb
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to known malicious infrastructure, as indicated by the PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK heuristic. The document body and embedded links suggest a lure related to downloading an application, likely a phishing or scam attempt. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=kinemaster+support+video+layer+apk+download In PDF document text
    • https://xafasujogi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374351/rorufurimurixag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rixilokif.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134109141/lemuremelinig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vodipewelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637384/kubewis_putukawis_zarivakomiz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fanavepuru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871984/5da837f468d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/rijudadubawif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rirumuzog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134109041/vopuwubuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f05b2144-4673-47dd-9977-5400c3e307b6/didatowovokanikapu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/68f32d68-590a-4e61-876a-ada190690422/12421932017.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b3e187bf-80be-4892-b1fa-cf0ebead891e/71967333749.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/hamlet_character_analysis_essay.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/henghuili-files2/12764802932.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/purixifusipelid/subererokekedaboroj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/buganabowumujef/public_finance_in_theory_and_practice_ulbrich.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4784/4000/files/jabudofuje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/0593/3730/files/8544850049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6811/9445/files/85997275090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/5916/2521/files/instagram_direct_message_recovery_android.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0440/7289/4629/files/brydge_ipad_pro_keyboard_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006df9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6DF9 5392 bytes
SHA-256: 9a49b5279f564f9a2328c245ab933bfec13f56451ba292fe9145c9eb5e1a6ddc
font_01_sfnt_off00008046.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8046 10680 bytes
SHA-256: 43cbbabde0f37b8153946d8c3ac70e594ccc40ed571f32571cddc37f7b9312ed