Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 607d2c724d391c89…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.5 KB Created: 2021-10-04 23:14:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: e32ec282bf7922744f52f1d378f61f23 SHA-1: fafdd12554aed7c21058e416b2af2ee0993a6a27 SHA-256: 607d2c724d391c8995b64942631e0dcced1d48fb7e19ca8be612fc9f3cc40888
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or trojan threat. It contains embedded JavaScript and multiple URLs, some pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites. The heuristics also indicate urgency and invoice lures, consistent with phishing attempts.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9971

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://catamma.ru/uplcv?utm_term=economics+1a+questions+and+answers
    • http://congseng.com/uploadfile/files/95462084978.pdf
    • http://kco.su/userfiles/file/borapoja.pdf
    • https://chinatupai.com/web/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/3127001100.pdf
    • http://tzsunup.com/upload/nenufetidawed.pdf
    • http://macro-e.com/app/webroot/userfiles/files/xazaxipezazevegorajabir.pdf
    • https://www.modianodesign.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16145d525c7729---xuwumulofemizosoxebi.pdf
    • https://www.domosystem.gr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/63888367998.pdf
    • https://klingende-zeder.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614dd0ad0c135---74681932529.pdf
    • https://pataniforum.com/admin/jquery/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34257258867.pdf
    • https://himalayanthailand.com/image/upload/File/65593623671.pdf
    • http://ottotech.center/userfiles/file/zixevafub.pdf
    • http://xn--9i1b14l32gg2dsybq3b.com/upload/fckeditor/file/xamezakunugotanewame.pdf
    • http://calisnt.com/uploads/files/guwajevafaxawiluk.pdf
    • http://ukwoodrecycling.com/userfiles/files/soroniburoxawakakezaluvep.pdf
    • https://qkon.ca/images/file/53376278865.pdf
    • http://quiltingacademy.com/fckeditor/userfiles/file/99010808043.pdf
    • https://unitedcardsolutions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1614198c9abe2e---fazedezupapexotisawaxe.pdf
    • https://smwebtechnology.com/arishayurveda.com/userfiles/file/15585474288.pdf
    • http://classicalgardenornaments.com/uplds/file/20938406567.pdf
    • http://hellnocancershow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140b8f711ff4---93279467596.pdf
    • http://songdolandmarkcity.com/userfiles/file/busemakokewefi.pdf
    • http://bonezi.morefriendship.com/upload/files/53368040525.pdf
    • http://irodori.kir.jp/files/file/25141905890.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f8d9.bin
41803e3fee23d95a3ff1a6328b2415d2c36bd641bfba4c9c11025a0b724726d3		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8D9 10852 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000111ce.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x111CE 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000129e0.bin
ffb9d8f9562631e06489ef0467142a76634bd6e404dcf9dc88e10c573fe32649		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x129E0 19036 bytes

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