Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6063646edf83e173…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.5 KB Created: 2021-03-23 23:30:27 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: 8db181881f9a61ef498b70d6fc64e880 SHA-1: 5702f65749b9f598cb764485fcbc62a968939821 SHA-256: 6063646edf83e173dc1d7b5fa7d56facaab3c9c6d201708c273e4d0e55cae030
226 Risk Score
Tags
free-cdn-ebook-manual-lure

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains an embedded JavaScript payload that likely attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body and heuristics suggest a lure related to 'Automate excel reports with powershell', indicating a phishing or social engineering attempt. The presence of multiple external URIs and the ML classifier's high confidence score support the malicious verdict.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://xajibur.ru/123?utm_term=automate+excel+reports+with+powershell PDF link annotation
    • http://penoligis.22web.org/xemifolasawopimedos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gloslides.com/cortisone_shot_shoulder_recoveryk540z.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://missunik.space/cuanto_es_150_gramos_de_carne_en_tazas4smoh.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4489844/normal_6046b340c4610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408319/normal_60220e6859349.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://texuxetikarobu.iblogger.org/do_lock_pick_guns_work.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lefavapexusa.iblogger.org/application_form_for_british_citizenship_2018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4479436/normal_6035c0dfc9a9d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://2d130471-2a64-48ba-87cf-8f1e86c6acad.fileIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://2d130471-2a64-48ba-87cf-8f1e86c6acad.filesusr.com/ugd/9c43ec_0c734e0d3096456cbff840d4feb15136.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://36425c1f-c329-48aa-845d-1f8252cb45c8.filesusr.com/ugd/01d500_15e444f194de4fd99e7d2ef0e616656a.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://a3c35cc3-4a3f-4d41-ab51-8b3e4b114d30.filesusr.com/ugd/2b25b5_24310b0181494858ae6c3e3758f834e7.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://korurozebopela.epizy.com/zijajixulobuda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c8d6545b-350f-4e0f-bca4-7b4b2c0bb676/38561324691.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b2873885-f2b2-44b6-a9d6-d9b91c3bc268/44392434123.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://losisotudek.epizy.com/bupojemefalixa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://18cb0a1d-3822-48a5-9ca0-56465202bc9b.filesusr.com/ugd/96564c_634953d4a1f64bbabad5ffd0aabf8f3c.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/libusamagowuvo/mini_dv_cassette_adapter_vhs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/potamotaz/80701418122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wokesabisevo/vevaza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://a49a6154-edc8-4132-95a2-c7bb8d673fe9.filesusr.com/ugd/551169_0e45b74cf20f4c628edb5e545137d5d7.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ninazarila/sheetjs_set_cell_width.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014c7d.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14C7D 1636 bytes
SHA-256: b0baa6fbf0a3f0b512eeadfa0aa13df78fa7801c9816bc1f9d2e82743628a146
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='OpenOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Widuhu Yupozoroka</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Automate excel reports with powershell.   Microsoft Excel is one of those ubiquitous tools most of us can’t escape even if we tried. Many IT</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Automate excel reports with powershell.   Microsoft Excel is one of those ubiquitous tools most of us can’t escape even if we tried. Many IT</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Automate excel reports with powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='OpenOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-07-15T20:24:52'
  xmp:CreatorTool='OpenOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1588d491-5a6a-488c-a422-e008ffcbab59'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='62359891-f14b-42d3-a52e-fb97685970ad'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000f755.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF755 4932 bytes
SHA-256: 69408208067a90f0e54585fd7b975bf5d21ec28c30ca03dcad7a1efdcf1591b1
font_01_sfnt_off00010881.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10881 5324 bytes
SHA-256: 79a762fbf50eed021348527f5799aaa8c441c1807e5eb74e30fc46f5b2db8f8e
font_02_sfnt_off00011a7c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11A7C 11680 bytes
SHA-256: af58f95361f0200c73e97e3fbb3648a64c13a21919541e815736147dfc83f258

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