MALICIOUS
458
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1059.007 JavaScript
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The PDF file contains JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` function, which is known to be used for launching embedded executables. This is further supported by critical heuristics indicating a launch action targeting `cmd.exe` and an embedded file masquerading as a PDF but detected as a Windows executable. The embedded JavaScript is designed to export an object named 'manualeagadslvoip-1', likely initiating the execution chain.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9983
Heuristics 12
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Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
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Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCHPDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
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/Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMANDPDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\manualeagadslvoip-1.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
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Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCHAn /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
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ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
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ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAVClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
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/Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JSPDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://alicegate
- http://192.168.1.1
- http://www.zeustech.net/
- http://]hostname[:port]/path
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/tiff/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/exif/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/photoshop/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://www.apache.org/
Extracted artifacts 7
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
manualeagadslvoip-1.pdf1013c84c602b4e1676139003d1d51b161d951da0fb7d0da84fc304554f5fa439 |
pdf-embedded-file | PDF EmbeddedFile object 502 at offset 0x508D14 | 73802 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
Win.Exploit.Countdown-1
Obfuscation or payload:
unlikely
|
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javascript_obj0503_000.js5986111e7e8735c1e1cf4f54c4db9c056e8b74bbe0f8fabba9553610cdb57384 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 503 at offset 0x5139C7 | 68 bytes |
font_00_cff_off003da0b3.bina0e659417feaa6450ab20fed6c5e4d904d3801877145150769b0111201feffd2 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x3DA0B3 | 4175 bytes |
font_01_cff_off003dafa7.binea2d84f9a8342c14ac6524175e704393717a4353662b3228fb1ed347d79a986d |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0x3DAFA7 | 322 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off003db20a.binf4bbf4dad170ba62bb21676a5ec7776dbbbfcbdd6d988fbddd58a7541e442dbe |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3DB20A | 34860 bytes |
font_03_sfnt_off003dfa88.bin14bd344fe095674b24d6892757861a0de43599f1c41fb28dbe01f995060c27c4 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3DFA88 | 37196 bytes |
font_04_sfnt_off003e495c.bin511f882bcff6b3abed4bba680cf2cba2c44ea1cad62c213e6767f778f8331a2a |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x3E495C | 93432 bytes |
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