Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6047613430ee1af4…

MALICIOUS

PDF

70.6 KB Created: 2020-12-27 14:10:03 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 867ab6ebfe70d0d6071fc0e2891b35df SHA-1: deec936133b811dee6c9748cf920de69952e723c SHA-256: 6047613430ee1af4b6dee9b29bf482be352c32b265a7b56dedce900c126e013f
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, with at least one identified as a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'electronic projects for dummies pdf'. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of malicious redirector links and link farming on disposable hosting.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/strik?utm_term=electronic+projects+for+dummies+pdf
    • https://bejokezogakuji.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695802/7bef8.pdf
    • https://selokifasafu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134383977/a068ad.pdf
    • https://jepalojut.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863082/domesowafaz.pdf
    • https://jatorogerujew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710569/8c3f11ed.pdf
    • https://mozesewopizudal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363743/804453.pdf
    • https://valexipeval.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775413/sigubizomofediwabik.pdf
    • https://varusimutajol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134502614/5413094.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/tiwumixe/ijGfjhi/danoloreziga.pdf
    • https://xoretesani.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315313/bugubatipu_wujuniwegixopa.pdf
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/gibuzini/PibgJha/78543148845.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/819bf47c-992e-4ba8-a54a-8051cbdb89e9/favubopusupijaruf.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/266febe5-75c1-4336-92fe-06a610a111b9/monty_python_last_supper_skit.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/415a59a0-8891-44dd-aff7-25ed330bb8b4/peso_del_alambron.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mamukawaxatali/toronto_white_pages_toronto.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d906.bin
a93965cda5cf5729d84f2969cedec29c7fd753e53f0bc146b9fb11778d4c1a86		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD906 5124 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ea6c.bin
09fc6b27ad1a5873cc0127e909914f608e96da21a856a27a076a591b1f9b9955		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA6C 10252 bytes

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