MALICIOUS
304
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
This PDF document exhibits multiple high-severity heuristics indicating malicious intent, including ML classification, random URL links, and lures for payment redirection, MFA harvesting, and callback phishing. The embedded links point to various compromised CMS upload locations and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to host malicious content or redirect users to phishing sites. The document's structure and heuristics strongly suggest it is part of a phishing campaign designed to trick users into clicking malicious links.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9954
Heuristics 11
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ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTIONClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
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PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINKPDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
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MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LUREDocument asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
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Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LUREDocument describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
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PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARMPDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
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Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARMSmall PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
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Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LUREDocument asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
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Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LUREDocument contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
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External URI info PDF_URIPDF contains an external URL action
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Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTALThe same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://lideparts.com/userfiles/file/1620933115.pdf
- http://kojeneckezbozi.eu/userfiles/file/46401287908.pdf
- http://www.kissdocs.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160aec9ab3e11e---26795626193.pdf
- http://jtour.vn/userfiles/file/xusezegapikowo.pdf
- http://clinicaveterinariabilancino.it/userfiles/files/53694261360.pdf
- http://www.shipsupply.co.mz/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b889507d52---binitux.pdf
- http://barrarioservicos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c4608d65a19---10312436973.pdf
- http://philippinesroadshow.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f02a1921b82f2f96bce1b83962ac0a41/77054976854.pdf
- http://spy-military-labs.com/userfiles/file/88754727991.pdf
- https://globalazeri.az/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b28htpqehrchdu9vturarqe7n1/sinusidofasadorokodivopok.pdf
- http://dom-nenilovo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/76d020a182fec91aef933d458b76abc5/niwizadanemajek.pdf
- https://stollerco.com/testingsites/advantage_aviation/assets/media/file/16489882910.pdf
- https://machinex-machines.com/UserFiles/File/lutuxixevusani.pdf
- http://handgun.ee/media/file/4228973280.pdf
- https://techson-cctv.com/upload/file/50713707922.pdf
- https://bawaniint.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zelazixane.pdf
- http://www.alquilerbares.com.ar/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607aff0bc6cb9---74435041871.pdf
- http://birzebbugastpetersfc.com/files/file/5428298442.pdf
- http://landmanenterprises.com/clients/6/66/660ad4be7ac834282af30b44844c6003/File/89457574788.pdf
- http://sintjorisparochie.nl/userfiles/file/40240365652.pdf
- https://toppelletmachine.com/d/files/funerubezefipuligozufate.pdf
- http://tatishev.ru/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/68401019595.pdf
- https://mangonebike.com/uploads/file/46157266994.pdf
- http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/s5utft4hbl5sbeokhmgkj27ug6/73848258147.pdf
- https://microfocus-realize2020mea.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dc12be8750984a51e19a95aa67a6dc54/58845359346.pdf
- https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+activate+my+pa+ebt+card
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
- http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
- http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
font_00_sfnt_off0001b04f.bina384826c4f19e681c34af068eda3a8d9335aff02ea65cec1554fba310089474d |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B04F | 19168 bytes |
font_01_sfnt_off0001e18e.binf4b13e95c801f26c041f2451a645346c5087ec76680dee0081472b4afad61e56 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1E18E | 10752 bytes |
font_02_sfnt_off0001fa20.bin9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1FA20 | 16792 bytes |
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