Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 602741071b2e71f4…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

29.0 KB First seen: 2023-03-22
MD5: 28d93cc0638002feafa3896879a28d62 SHA-1: e8e4d93dcc60b44b4e3c7b48e5cf8ba3616785c8 SHA-256: 602741071b2e71f45452d67885083f6d2cd0833d9d2ed6dd753321b934e9c3ad
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The presence of \objupdate and a lure to 'Enable editing' strongly suggests the document is designed to trigger this exploit upon opening. The embedded OLE object data is likely a secondary payload or exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004951.bin
80332b54054a1990e98fe835507bf6a5b1c33be1d73bba760b6196137d8ecbf1
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4951 1691 bytes