Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 601a348108ed65bb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.80 MB
MD5: 1a4476dcb4f30af5627414d6d7c53197 SHA-1: b1a0b66df0d39079cb34ae4698ad2246ef51d5aa SHA-256: 601a348108ed65bb77fe70aae41f9dbf43f9d84dea50611401b63b168e23e6ae
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of these embedded objects, leading to the exploitation of the vulnerability. The decoded object data suggests the presence of a VBScript payload, likely intended to download and execute a second-stage malicious file.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000119b.bin
02587bf9483bf4e50a7c4a9cad30818bb9548ab0e16bccf69631377d54d4d199
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x119B 36372 bytes
objdata_01_off0002008b.bin
ef0bb09b1fe26f02beb6d60cd6666d2695e11a9b10a3296072737984662626fe
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2008B 418576 bytes