Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 6011bb50b573ee8e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.59 MB
MD5: f0855d81029a59eb886b90128a54e96d SHA-1: 79b3c54f2a6d966b34791502bd7490ab06a19517 SHA-256: 6011bb50b573ee8eac82edf41fdbb7d114071d5e407d56403417ea56054246e6
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers heuristics related to CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability. This vulnerability is commonly used to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a secondary payload. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX further suggests the embedding of a malicious payload within the document.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~1656KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000017bd.bin
65ebe04a442b154d2efc9f359f600ff0867e4f9743f99af4c6b6626e1b94f5b1		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x17BD 828440 bytes

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