Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fefb2ee55c0c902…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.04 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-07
MD5: 368215a43ab9d73ba350102662018645 SHA-1: 5f68ba6a009f47194f19958e162880f6a0d3bd8e SHA-256: 5fefb2ee55c0c90204e33dbc06b98fb83c1269a8db289ec31f1acc2a87fa9b4e
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing a malicious Equation Editor OLE object. This object exploits CVE-2017-11882, a known vulnerability that allows for arbitrary code execution. The VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, indicating the exploit is likely delivered via the OLE object itself. The primary IOC is the CVE identifier for the exploited vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
2eb9789e354909e9cc070edba41aa4bb49a9c1ecbd2df9b34726ae2d9b006da7
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD018E1A38/ole10nAtIvE 1477 bytes