PDF malware analysis — malicious · 5feba66308428f52

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.5 KB

MD5: e77cf7af060da2e265d5bacf6d651885 SHA-1: 76dae836c33d58848edfdf0907696e133a62cb50 SHA-256: 5feba66308428f5290c1ecce09168972ccff814e423f6a69a7e9c5e1b421ea78

156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF sample contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes eval() and String.fromCharCode(), indicating an attempt to obfuscate and execute malicious code. This pattern is commonly used to download and execute further stages of malware. No specific family could be identified, and no malicious URLs or hashes were directly extracted.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.6566

Heuristics 6

PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER

PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
eval() call high PDF_EVAL

eval() found — commonly used for obfuscated exploit execution (matched inside decoded stream)
JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT

PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS

PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
String.fromCharCode low PDF_FROMCHARCODE

String.fromCharCode found — used to construct payload strings dynamically. Common in benign JavaScript libraries for codepoint manipulation, so this alone is informational; weaponised use is also caught by the dedicated fromCharCode-stage and exploit-shape rules. (matched inside decoded stream)
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`stream_003_off000004ba.bin` `4447bc3bf2370788a868beaf4e818cbde6061d04686c8a8695d700584551fe2b`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x4BA	4794 bytes
`objstm_0025_00.bin` `f19dd6be488e6d797f0b0b9d21af0b70b0c029dd56a3f5a52c776eb2afc47f7e`	pdf-objstm-decoded	PDF /ObjStm 25 0 obj (inflated)	428 bytes

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