Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fe721c5395fad7e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

101.1 KB First seen: 2023-08-18
MD5: 863b5a53f744be17a85bc9bda4d056a2 SHA-1: 68c005ec1087d1664f168a82273b32e91ac33eec SHA-256: 5fe721c5395fad7e07eb11ca84daa0508aff3236f87c4a4ce6e733318371ce2b
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The presence of \objupdate indicates an attempt to force OLE activation. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass macro security settings and trigger the embedded exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004095.bin
b239fef317ed1f325991f89a72d677c4113744a33557b2544aebf004e4c4fd22
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4095 1685 bytes