Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fd0b822ad94a9e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB First seen: 2024-06-04
MD5: 5b1fff3e8722f0f58154f703a940a712 SHA-1: 3fe47c2cd4477a37336f8e3a0cf11892dc70d612 SHA-256: 5fd0b822ad94a9e187de405ff667ad2316117ffb3cd8acee566c4f5224eb326b
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive forces the activation of this object, leading to the execution of arbitrary code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000115.bin
22f18f40decf545279df714e01d19854950ba9e71fdf321af743604c99e31540
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x115 1713 bytes