Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fc170df81548737…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.6 KB Created: 2021-06-27 23:43:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: 3fc846cc2648b5e076a57eaa40159b83 SHA-1: 9b1052f3eb94678d478f8d1a6a91e5c6cec8f10c SHA-256: 5fc170df81548737d6ee97ec0fcb69a0c128edb2992666cae38e4bdfa057f045
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document employs social engineering tactics, including a fake download button and a lure for browser extension installation, to trick users into downloading malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely leading to the execution of a secondary payload via embedded JavaScript. The document also contains numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress sites, suggesting a distribution network for malicious files.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9964

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://laborke.ru/uplcv?utm_term=agent+user+switcher+for+chrome PDF link annotation
    • http://go-trec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0vqtfjihto9dk9dk5gm8oths3e/36979822532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rethabise.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a632233af3---55269358898.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.petersmetalstitching.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a9db9e399cf---vunigaminovenub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.reroofingbrisbaneqld.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607774fbafe9b---jozovibusuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baschin-heizung.com/meineBilderAlbertGrundschule/file/zezapufogozomonuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nepalmicrofinancesummit.org/userfiles/files/zavujiwuwidojuvogor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://birnagarcollege.in/userfiles/file/97713561100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stroisvias.ru/userfiles/file/91888174682.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pngroup.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gakesi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://premiumtrade.ro/ckfinder/userfiles/files/32599634091.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://10kshot.com/customerinterview/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dakufunesojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sacproblemleri.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096cb2ed2d1e---89047618152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://solarconsulting.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/46c356e641ba7741ca2757ab61e8eca6/94012851640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ukdirectremovals.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a2e1cf04adf5035057b4e423a89efb84/jajiwizabekutimik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.dynasil.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/13f5bc3a5c4e749c1d0e9b0d92cb549e/nasabuzivonupojun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.conkite.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e15658d7ff97a562da4596ad5caa62de/55849497994.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.gml.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c3e46fa34a4---gipofapefax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reversetheclocknow.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tixesapiwub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ligneus.hu/upload/file/48464574814.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bannails.com/fckeditor_userfiles/file/zamega.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.entornopublicitario.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7cb58a84e1a621d365b6b68182861e5f/lixogasinimobomebuzodese.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://amagi.la/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608998092b024---metererijezowevepinema.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f006.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF006 10740 bytes
SHA-256: c6e10ad37971e0827d6096489954b0c6fbc43ca51c0072e55f2c5da676a78a2b
font_01_sfnt_off000108a8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108A8 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000120ba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x120BA 28068 bytes
SHA-256: d8a886126af518c402febfc07b609a7cb82e291a993db9c2f12df130043cadc1

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