Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5fb935684c2c1c04…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

366.0 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: c51642de6dfa4a4dce3183f5092aa786 SHA-1: ddc624fcc0f1fd9c72d95787f840c9149cefb48d SHA-256: 5fb935684c2c1c04e2d762e58cea53628cfb4be40101ee909b020eb2338496f5
360 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting CVE-2006-6456, a critical vulnerability in older Word versions. Heuristics indicate the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress APIs, strongly suggesting the execution of arbitrary code. The presence of 'cmd.exe' with an execution flag and the 'SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND' heuristic further point to the execution of shell commands, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific family could be identified.

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2006-6456 — Microsoft Word malformed table SPRM critical CVE exact CVE_2006_6456
    WordDocument contains a malformed table border-color SPRM in the CVE-2006-6456 shape: a valid table-SPRM cluster is followed by an invalid high-byte 0xFF SPRM where Word expects a normal sprmTBrc*Cv record. Vulnerable Word 2000/2002/2003 parsers corrupt memory while handling this malformed data structure.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 374,784 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 279,983 bytes (75%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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