Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f98840bdf97aae3…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.9 KB Created: 2021-02-20 07:54:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-06-17
MD5: 019ab6665c4523e0b965f7fed2646fb5 SHA-1: bf3f4bbda30a601e43b8b38b8d84a08da100da3e SHA-256: 5f98840bdf97aae3c3db4a47c05dfc35302b235858ac2f6310841d5fd01dd683
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to disposable domains, designed to act as a link farm. One critical heuristic indicates a direct link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting the primary purpose is to funnel users to malicious sites. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and URL patterns are indicative of phishing or malware distribution lures.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crophysi.ru/wix?keyword=give+me+liberty+4th+edition+volume+1+ebook In PDF document text
    • http://ruszaimclub.ru/rugexudadidikabazewjgcw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4383582/normal_6001b11b3a429.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bezijenogekise.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134875893/votupifatixor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://websporizle4.com/dante_s_inferno_pc_kickassnzbc4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4388424/normal_5ff85bffe6c8f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://boliminukedakos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134494229/kapozesuxobegis-zogonub-nilojefad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4455907/normal_602ef3096e98e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4412154/normal_602e2cf40bd61.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sikepelisu.22web.org/android_version_7_mobiles.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tikovg.xyz/56827277147c27ov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366381/normal_5fdbc6ec78d16.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://dowinoxerirud.epizy.com/94192692801.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://jatujij.rf.gd/60072298613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zoxutuperovizo.epizy.com/27022817712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fuwenoxuzasila/dictionary._com_crossword_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rubidokezive/when_you_believe_music_video.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d467.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD467 5096 bytes
SHA-256: 6612941b692dafd5bfe84f4d0acd0e2d27eeb141b920e426dc72c8dffbc66522
font_01_sfnt_off0000e5aa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE5AA 10140 bytes
SHA-256: 2bb49e9af8cf9b8dbb401ce4de19ec3e0a2e43845ac64e2604a8cabf7f32b445
font_02_sfnt_off00010871.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10871 4324 bytes
SHA-256: 05d2457133b820fa77aa358e30e9acfbad3f04c46ced9a37296d9311117db176

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