PDF malware analysis — malicious · 5f985657bcb3d7ad

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.5 KB Created: 2020-08-11 18:40:14 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)

MD5: 5e831fa9bab281070fbeba102e6a26e2 SHA-1: aea45140d0f7415e6af00f8df57beb28ac911da2 SHA-256: 5f985657bcb3d7ad91c5361b1930cf3bb59a6e40a8825d04d7fe9c6528b39503

154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains a link farm and a direct link to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though obfuscated, contains text related to an 'Odisha police verification form pdf' and a URL that further supports the lure. The primary attack pattern involves redirecting the user to malicious infrastructure via a deceptive link.

Machine Learning

Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK

PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM

Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=odisha+police+verification+form+pdf
- http://files.jeffreyscottsalsbury.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406412/710706.pdf
- http://files.hangoutwithjesus.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131405958/gejosegosoja.pdf
- http://weviga.diminnicucci.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871721/d7d77e22.pdf
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/
- http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4474/8950/files/79992317479.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2508/8168/files/795056967.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/4893/4295/files/54962253644.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/0184/5659/files/windows_meadia_player_9.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/66083684812.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8909/9938/files/center_of_gravity_formula.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/5027/0869/files/new_buffettology.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5203/9324/files/more_perks_ttw.pdf
- https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/2193/3466/files/5783779181.pdf
- http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
- http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`font_00_sfnt_off00005fc9.bin` `3bae768e538b606637f19e061cedec0a0efe74e1c61129d23f6221db27392db5`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5FC9	5480 bytes
`font_01_sfnt_off00007248.bin` `a2322c84db4878edaaff97e8e22273fc6760d6114c018f723d13e1d072364e0f`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7248	10304 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.