Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f96759bc9f27ebc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

25.4 KB Created: 2016-11-21 11:12:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2017-03-23
MD5: cdf7b9605c41ea45ebc03e8288b5db87 SHA-1: 7a190ce8442db538d17883c381839d2ff74d6384 SHA-256: 5f96759bc9f27ebc6dc8320b343c18c1c07748d3a5f53bb414d977f03984b948
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The file is identified as malicious due to the presence of an embedded OLE object which is flagged as dropping an auto-executable payload, specifically a JavaScript file. ClamAV also detected this file as 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-5901831-0'. The embedded OLE object and the dropped JavaScript file are the primary indicators of malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-5901831-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-5901831-0
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word\embeddings\oleObject1.bin 38912 bytes
SHA-256: 1f9395a7a20060da6a33146be4ff11b7ca18d173725e485a48c22d00bc169a26
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-5901831-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word\embeddings\oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 30585 bytes
SHA-256: 8705211f553cfed8609e2961b0b607b1d75947f82a933c9fdb696c9fee859f5e

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