Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f8c2ba7590688dc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.17 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-21
MD5: 50f41a65695e067c4d475258f1e4dbc6 SHA-1: 93d9699b8ba672cb90f5e89b5f69d338909306f5 SHA-256: 5f8c2ba7590688dc4763024a6881cd3a66dcda927e11bbafe8501c00d9793008
274 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking T1204 User Execution

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which exhibits suspicious static findings, including a direct link to a payload. The PDF also uses parser-evasion techniques. The VBA macros are benign and do not contain executable statements.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • https://mobile.mail.yahoo.com/apps/affiliateRouter?brandUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fparg.co/UZzB&appName=YMailNorrin&partner=2&locale=1&pageId=&clickRef=contact_card&region=na&annotation=&buckets=

Extracted artifacts 8

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
dc970b1a78b8c61d242820d54996c1bf7aac8e9a89ee92575ea67669edf7e09b		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00015109/ole10nATivE 1259 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
1c043edb9159ba059e01752c846363f54e303758d4313e4ed01c4b221c0f66d3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1218048 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006400.pdf
009846d1f62f0796e5f30129d469982f75d3e969fce280cdb56f6e24fc35c0bc		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6400 1197056 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e400.pdf
511ad21ba382c8088f1be109b64c7d9256d4959a632c3d30369b3cfc9056ed6c		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE400 1164288 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0001dc00.pdf
c8ac7a70c476fb113eedc6f4e1485493672b1296bd90a6891257b645cfde4789		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1DC00 1100800 bytes

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