Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f7886a3c43bf64c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 00525b56c6371a2c375bf1269d9b30c8 SHA-1: 35dff14d53e105700835bbd18061d4a0eba8f3b1 SHA-256: 5f7886a3c43bf64cb457e226c1ef26d52ce63ffff2eba7dcdb005ea04bc15b8a
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, specifically related to the Equation Editor OLE object. The presence of \objdata, \objupdate, and an automatically linked OLE object strongly suggests that the file is designed to trigger this vulnerability for client-side code execution. The file is likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c2.bin
27b4b751584c6857ea797b7d9604279d110838f77422521e67cda5a6ee785e0b		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC2 1932 bytes

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