Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f6d69e58850b096…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

165.0 KB
MD5: ebabb1989e79d2a08e33324143cf1dc4 SHA-1: 04d49e26d06873eab612a6db63899749a7b5b107 SHA-256: 5f6d69e58850b0965c708c5e8cbf7f3f0a769a42c33abe4a82595f903ad92dbe
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains a high-confidence detection for Emotet, specifically a downloader variant. The critical heuristic 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' indicates an obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader that uses CreateObject and Shell execution. The 'Document_open' macro is present, which is a common execution vector for Emotet. The VBA script itself is heavily obfuscated but appears to be designed to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed0121-9822961-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2e7804ab75605a75d075d6d0c921f0be6aae14339dbe4dea8f7d3ec5e974f266		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13232 bytes

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