Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f57ff9e1cacb841…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

135.5 KB Created: 2020-01-24 18:06:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 57c4e7674ee48ba63462e1525b094b33 SHA-1: c08f305f45620b4016b4bd85f55fc86ff868d125 SHA-256: 5f57ff9e1cacb841e6e728fbb9ce5d082bae6fbc4c75756633c3007c7a195a1a
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This OOXML document contains a VBA project with a Document_Open macro, which is a common technique for executing malicious code upon opening. The presence of the GetObject call and the ClamAV detection signature 'Doc.Downloader.Generic-7561116-0' strongly indicate that this document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The macro's execution is the primary vector for this attack.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-7561116-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Generic-7561116-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
482ec4eda74b70deea3077b9a8e3e05151a851000795e4843d4aeaf5c85cd6b0		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 13246 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
a4a52ba11574b90ed72b778508a103679bb336156b28163ca04850eca5a2b410		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 113152 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Generic-7561116-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.