Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f2c05f77276bc06…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.7 KB First seen: 2022-11-28
MD5: 2eb86b4b125adfe139353b3c250389a8 SHA-1: 605c6af5d82c6a1d5e411bf07addea51e42a1cb9 SHA-256: 5f2c05f77276bc068123a7783e120fcc42ab008b460d4ad66853b5c2289f2b14
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing', suggesting the primary goal is to execute a malicious payload via the Equation Editor exploit.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000049bb.bin
4169eba5889d4c35123472b952b88364f97dd405b4b58eb75de3c02da7bde8f8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x49BB 1817 bytes