Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f1201355e96a05b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

17.1 KB
MD5: 9bb2a3e18c27b683118ee6e51bb811fe SHA-1: 61df30ed804ede32d514e49b1cd83ca4fc41b186 SHA-256: 5f1201355e96a05bf405091064785a663ddfa0cf829bb1b5092b08f409f0490e
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that triggers CVE-2017-11882 through the Equation Editor. This exploit allows for arbitrary code execution, indicating a malicious intent to compromise the user's system. The specific Equation Editor class 'EqUAtiON.3' is a key indicator of this exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Obfuscated Equation Editor ProgID + activation critical CVE related RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID from top-level \objdata hex after nested RTF junk groups are ignored, and the document also contains \objemb plus \objupdate activation. This is an obfuscated Equation Editor exploit surface associated with CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 families, but no exact malformed MTEF CVE primitive was recovered from this object.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001f61.bin
ceb5035b023dda61bfdbdb42368e530b1d3c3761598625eed6b2267e1c23d4bc
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F61 1667 bytes