Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5f0395c1c2722de0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.7 KB Created: 2020-07-09 22:06:12 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fdb5ec5d277fbf70015137051457f5ee SHA-1: 71cc68bc6f45fcabedec5fd55fc19c7452d1ae13 SHA-256: 5f0395c1c2722de0ac610898d3afa510a80744e9386facbc1dec2ea348ceef48
154 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to a link farm designed to manipulate search engine results. The primary link redirects to malicious infrastructure, suggesting an attempt to distribute malware or phish for information. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of malicious redirector links and a link farm.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=openshot%20video%20editor%20user%20manual%20pdf
    • http://files.clinicamenta.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775982/wogugop-sinumozeze-libivupinitu.pdf
    • http://files.bosfchounds.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637255/7558901.pdf
    • http://files.woutervanheesphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813558/boxodejulog_jesap_xaxotoxalawin_vaziji.pdf
    • http://files.upperclementscottages.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131408864/65544.pdf
    • http://files.ghostandribbon.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775870/c78a6717ae2b66.pdf
    • http://files.canalsigling.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383018/8717392.pdf
    • http://files.lockmangenetics.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775383/nizejab.pdf
    • http://files.turosmathclass.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815118/85ba701b.pdf
    • http://files.tarotartist.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681938/8280551.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://napipivo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/mudizabajut.pdf
    • https://gorebekox.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/37886029491.pdf
    • https://josejoxoboko.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/tegilalanitogogalokuro.pdf
    • https://nikemisar.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xisajunadimu.pdf
    • https://lusenexovaj.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/vexitagigow.pdf
    • https://nezikip.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/xugomugefaji.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tanedikefiresemur.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/3183641906.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/19189676900.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/tovaje.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006af4.bin
c0749e86dcfbe67772e46a4bd10696e9f49dd34d0e6de8192946c4a9f137d1e5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6AF4 5248 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007c9d.bin
28dd8864b8787bb5f3ba20080509ad84d3196b0310c2f91609d9fa4e9a36322b		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C9D 14700 bytes

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