Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5eddddc6fc18bdc3…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.2 KB
MD5: 7ff7824bdd44821f50bb518d31d70f78 SHA-1: a378e00a507cebf8a53ee4d7922e3010ec488a8e SHA-256: 5eddddc6fc18bdc36c4a35fbb808c767493f779c35d6fedaf08dca65c1309414
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an RTF document that contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Microsoft Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this known vulnerability to achieve arbitrary code execution upon opening. No further stages or IOCs were extracted from this specific file.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000e2.bin
cd15676d3553c78f6c922f9110726753774a70c0a597afe4aeb5e14b44574621
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE2 1839 bytes