Malicious Office (OLE) / .PPT — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ed53fddca4b630f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .PPT

240.0 KB Created: 2006-08-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office PowerPoint
MD5: e5190ba50fc28fe3da0a73e79b0795c9 SHA-1: 3e837bb334e791a7c01bedbf8c1325c289de32e1 SHA-256: 5ed53fddca4b630f9bde32007c6b5cbac4f0ce440ad8aa1a2bc2689c75f1f712
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic

The presentation file contains an obfuscated VBA macro that executes automatically upon closing. This macro attempts to download and execute a second-stage payload from the URL "http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/jaslpjidkokplsaplaslpasjj" using the Shell function, potentially invoking "ping.exe" or "WINWORD" as part of its execution chain. The obfuscation and use of Auto_Close indicate a malicious intent to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Close macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOCLOSE
    Auto_Close macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://1230948%1230948@j.mp/jaslpjidkokplsaplaslpasjj

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
2dfa44c98261cb2d84883ec1bcc7c31e2dd9d3e466ea85ea2c8ed30ddde4e106
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 21331 bytes