Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ed0e6a874dd31e1…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

14.2 KB
MD5: d3fc5e8ff743e58a6d26b8aefd123078 SHA-1: 45303a2e232ff40cfee467eccaa97e9d38a1f24c SHA-256: 5ed0e6a874dd31e18af503cc6a418a19627c5907fe6fd48262bedb07a7c85ebd
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). This exploit is designed to execute arbitrary code, likely leading to the download and execution of a secondary payload. The presence of RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics further confirms the exploitation mechanism.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000cc2.bin
d7a9954307e0c2c569015d7c79774657451ba50d43c47dcb7f9fbc2eb16e9268
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCC2 1462 bytes