RTF malware analysis — malicious · 5ec2c06b84aee30e

MALICIOUS

RTF

24.2 KB First seen: 2022-11-10

MD5: 1062fe7dd9eed3635639ed759a027b0b SHA-1: 68f7d2def96f8e4a2d3a59158fac28ef5ad5ab36 SHA-256: 5ec2c06b84aee30e25c73b8f176c3c7dd8739611a295be9312a29ea01dfba226

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object and triggers heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and OLE object activation. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic to bypass macro security. The presence of these elements strongly suggests an attempt to exploit a vulnerability, likely related to the Equation Editor, to execute malicious code.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00004c6e.bin` `4c842423753b1dfd4728da14e7c5aea708343fd3f5312ecc523d8b6fd1bac565`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x4C6E	1450 bytes

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