Emotet — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5eb02656c9d0f774…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

167.9 KB Created: 2021-01-13 06:30:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word
MD5: 265eac00afa62c7e92da8988d51ae7da SHA-1: 2d341415c447553e9deb2a594b0ec988293c8313 SHA-256: 5eb02656c9d0f774760331a9af55e93a774b09ceaf654a1f199ab800c8a00c50
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing heavily obfuscated VBA macros. The 'Document_open' subroutine and 'CreateObject' calls indicate an attempt to execute code automatically. The ClamAV signature 'Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0' strongly suggests this is an Emotet downloader variant, which typically downloads and executes further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 7

  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.EmotetRed02224-9938637-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
d32d44aa9067a01b867ee3cce82943066b374ccfb2dccb58a4818168c4fd6149		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 11025 bytes

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