Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5e88406cec139faa…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.5 KB Created: 2020-10-21 05:16:47 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-02-23
MD5: 8955c6aa74c798400728dc3b2517ab87 SHA-1: 8a038d4e233de4cb5b4ef2b21a0c5cd879764578 SHA-256: 5e88406cec139faa15e8e06e71067fa5dce92f5b7035d4b8dcda1fc6f8942adb
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=regimes+pol%25C3%25ADticos+e+formas+de+governo+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://buximinolid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381316/wusimalobuwalol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zegojipoxe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131069766/ef5858c355cfafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366031/normal_5f8715547da07.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4378856/normal_5f8d13d434bb9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375708/normal_5f8c819053a71.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369524/normal_5f8f59161bbb6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4382201/normal_5f8cfe593f23c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365621/normal_5f8758ff4b7c7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mesipaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383407/b21c0d5dc0f77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://runebipunozup.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406604/tepenu_jumiwisup_jilaba_jupivadonuwob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/446c1cb432722.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavoxoxuda.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379246/gituvewokokiniwi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/71f08a60-d4cb-45a3-9c32-470b690f5a45/19296543976.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f8d9ca07-6e78-46d5-ae7d-7782cfa8bef5/xivejadubadelabuxerin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cdf8e18a-daf9-4872-b296-44c5a5b6b8bb/xudepasosejavawawa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7479/8247/files/card_catalog_for_sale_michigan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0483/7231/8366/files/popsicle_challenge_tiktok.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000068cc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x68CC 5596 bytes
SHA-256: 7979b9e862b1814fb6dfe0d4c3ec2398372e11113c38d27cbf4ffc3fb2f7c272
font_01_sfnt_off00007bd3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7BD3 12696 bytes
SHA-256: 53a286e71ed095a577a072d9d003150c8378a907a9bb8785f89e8a10aa3be843

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