Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5e8639dfe91ea20f…

MALICIOUS

PDF

40.8 KB Created: 2020-08-11 05:27:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: ba2ace34969df1807bc93029dedc0559 SHA-1: a77f0df106d19c4ce697cf31314945e9c21c65c5 SHA-256: 5e8639dfe91ea20fe88db975832109328bef1df9a94b07efcf004eb1bdbbf2a8
222 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded links, one of which points to known malicious redirector infrastructure. Heuristics indicate it's a payment redirection lure and a link farm, suggesting the document's purpose is to trick users into clicking malicious URLs. No scripts were extracted, but the presence of multiple links and the ML classification strongly suggest malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE
    Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=tally+erp+9+voucher+entry+pdf
    • http://files.artbylatiolais.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813934/zutivazemedego_noxorelevawipon_raxevatud_zigemopol.pdf
    • http://files.sdlandsurveyor.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438059/xukitaronukuju.pdf
    • http://kuwivo.thetruthhemp.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070872/1512424.pdf
    • http://files.stjohnfrederika.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398246/supofaxusatiruno.pdf
    • http://files.fullcirclecounselling.com.au/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681826/gitujiroboker.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/2969/2577/files/accelerator_driven_system.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8266/1526/files/css_chemistry_past_papers.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4702/4805/files/8421291016.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5687/3128/files/99695246994.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7238/8246/files/jegunagobefupojetexe.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/8914/9608/files/lasuxezaxefi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/tebagomi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5602/9093/files/c_xml_to_json.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/4757/4949/files/cloud_9_github.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2381/0203/files/68510370283.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4856/6933/files/quando_quando_lyrics.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006216.bin
8b3f0a199385e4f4e037c496b39a702b6b7c83b46ee1b48115139b7c8ff136d1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6216 5332 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007445.bin
a02504256a1606e838498d8d934cea13ef05829ebc95b5606729cf2110f25c40
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7445 10068 bytes