RTF malware analysis — malicious · 5e7d378a416c17b0

MALICIOUS

RTF

94.8 KB First seen: 2023-01-19

MD5: 217788cac1d6dd5b604d004c54a5a007 SHA-1: cf57dbe9fe1c71105697d154e263ddd5ebc82ece SHA-256: 5e7d378a416c17b03c3c50ae2438636bb1467f58947d83583323e0d605ea076f

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing'. This combination strongly suggests a malicious document designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000532e.bin` `d54158592347dc46d0227ae796b5a9188653689641985f9093c353710cb19de4`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x532E	2008 bytes

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