Office (OLE) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · 5e138035c574034d

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

214.0 KB Created: 2000-04-13 21:48:14 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: aae5b4c8eb3968b6bf06074865070a4e SHA-1: 35a4e0593009278aa41f9b35edff28ed0a176214 SHA-256: 5e138035c574034de0be2d3ae24bab8763fb918b3d0891311446b29663568534

378 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample contains an obfuscated Workbook_Open VBA macro that utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject to download and execute a second-stage payload from one of the embedded URLs. The macro's intent is to download and execute a payload, as indicated by the 'OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC' and 'OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER' heuristics. The document body's invoice-like language, combined with the macro's functionality, suggests a lure to trick the user into opening the document and triggering the malicious macro.

Heuristics 11

WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT

WScript.Shell usage
VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC

VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER

Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY

OLE file is 219,136 bytes but its declared streams total only 105,345 bytes — 113,791 bytes (52%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains VBA macro code
Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON

Environ() call (env variable access)
Fake invoice / payment lure low SE_INVOICE_LURE

Document contains invoice or payment language paired with an action verb — useful context when combined with link, macro, or attachment indicators
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
URL https://speechelo-online.com/wp-content/plugins/wordpress-seo-premium/vendor/composer/Xx8PRnR69.phpl
- https://secaudit.e-m2.net/wp-content/themes/finvision-c4521=5+hild/template-parts/blog-regular/Rib3TgWd3v.php
- https://steijnborg.mobilitum.com/wp-content/themes/twentytwentyone/template-parts/content/WjovFkpG3.php)p@gk\%|p
- https://fitzgeraldstreet.com/ap-photos/themes/modus/css/fontello/1j5yZLSi4VE.php/--t3hqhMugjudl
- https://ahdmsport.com/bootstrap/scripts/_notes/Xwi4K0BrmwX6hf.php2D8B.idWdD
- https://teste.sitiodoastronauta.com.br/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `5ef46bee0d652adc721c36143042190fe616a4317c445f312c1fc558677f8942`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	15179 bytes

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