Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5e12f5142a366cc6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

23.6 KB First seen: 2022-11-25
MD5: ba8da36d2efd359e604bd05b452bc448 SHA-1: 1fe06747d2a03f8b293b525d31ffcb4de85c6bb7 SHA-256: 5e12f5142a366cc6500db37936449279fafc38b2048dfa3748be1aa4d422733d
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1566 Phishing

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object with a specific ProgID indicating a likely exploit targeting Microsoft Equation Editor. The \objupdate directive suggests that the embedded object will be automatically activated upon opening, triggering the exploit. The document body contains a lure to 'Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security warnings and trick users into executing malicious content.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004a5a.bin
219a630ed69b1b4d01a18eea08f16f108dcbf6500df7946e0f859d6ab3974498
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4A5A 1431 bytes