Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5dfca625893c0215…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

223.3 KB Created: 2021-04-18 19:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: e6312dc3082bbf9f1fcbec2905638b64 SHA-1: 5e555c4bc6629a221a3df676aafd0624d17ace10 SHA-256: 5dfca625893c0215fd5aabc7be6dfdc7534fd579e2e72a7e58e14dbb3750097c
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a DOCX file that leverages an embedded RTF object via altChunk. This RTF object contains multiple critical vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor), CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX OLE activation), and CVE-2026-21514 (Word/OLE security bypass). These vulnerabilities are designed to trigger OLE object activation and code execution, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of these specific CVEs strongly suggests an exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/rary.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/infopath/2007/PartnerControls
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/contentType
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/metadata/properties/metaAttributes
    • http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/documentManagement/types
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/metadata/core-properties
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://purl.org/dc/terms/
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/internal/obd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dc.xsd
    • http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2003/04/02/dcterms.xsd
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/sharepoint/v3/contenttype/forms
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/cus�

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af79f.bin
79b387df746a9352c030b5b73c45237019100a2a779a4f677f9604b2f974733b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF79F 85626 bytes
objdata_01_off000e8850.bin
31d0b0c8736350c29d658081251eef2ad4e59509fe8222d5a28340dc0162ca79
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE8850 583987 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799
rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes