Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5ddb1175b869f9cc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.6 KB Created: 2020-11-30 04:52:25 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-10
MD5: a01f0ad32f7a76974a3e78000f340033 SHA-1: bf69d88997a0e90a8b2c7f1fa8847951dbc8bd3e SHA-256: 5ddb1175b869f9cc1da538bbb5800914647b20d9c87e9c8fce072679d831b6c9
244 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/wb?keyword=cartesian%20plane%20worksheet%20grade%208%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://zevejekigo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134374512/nipuwozipabegulelaku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://belafawejogawol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134583754/6938139.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jorokepevi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134688072/6949542.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://woliwaluv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134686062/lidesigulum-zigeb-rukekaxukazinaw-fuvolomepida.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vewawuwidavejo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134403009/lopegobup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sufudoni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134853368/7780490.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sutudaxete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134497902/jesaxoduko-wetosunuduzikub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mitixofixomu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333727/2183758.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/4918653.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ec99e2b3-ced8-4820-b7f3-fec82f91b038/minecraft_10.5_apk_indir_cepde.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/wuniku/ear_ringing_superstition.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kulinisokakewi/miso_pin_full_form.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/rafiralexezol/luzaxuzufek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/03d1a47e-3408-46a9-a0c0-445044b76984/moonlight_slumber_little_dreamer_when_to_flip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/79b38a38-f0ce-4216-95ed-397cf7d04527/57127980089.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000be93.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBE93 5556 bytes
SHA-256: 3ea98c4303ada58635812f8977b430933090a5ef26619becf00e16317cb766cf
font_01_sfnt_off0000d185.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD185 10508 bytes
SHA-256: 5d554e198e7868937201f9cc07d6e4ea323998b6948225b83950ec9ca4a45769

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