Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5db03537503125d0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

48.0 KB First seen: 2022-08-27
MD5: 5ef29fd651488342c07aadd3acafb704 SHA-1: 2ab526a5178200a54c74b3e6b735ff48295af986 SHA-256: 5db03537503125d015e4d3a23d3aed40a7a98f661a622943c0ab6bd438092bfc
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an encrypted Office document that leverages CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution. The heuristic indicates it acts as an exploit carrier, attempting to load a remote resource from the URL http://www.mygreatlearning.com@192.3.108.11/vnc/https_o/www.doc. This suggests a downloader or initial access mechanism for a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.mygreatlearning.com@192.3.108.11/vnc/https_o/www.doc