Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 5daa1cd67f193c97…

MALICIOUS

PDF

93.9 KB Created: 2021-08-13 14:49:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-23
MD5: a69468dd3e8f7b02a1be2dbe670e8702 SHA-1: 268bf4479b0a6bd716d2490bc4cd07535cff9902 SHA-256: 5daa1cd67f193c979d762023aea65ccf827c808ea0aeadbd739bbb639509071a
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting it's designed to lure users to malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution via these links. No scripts were extracted, and the document body was unreadable, so the attack pattern is inferred from the link farm heuristics.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://raduzhniy.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a070d364d2e---57890873496.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://boulderdivorcelaw.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c9879d390b1---dadasin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://goref.ru/files/file/50494074565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://mijneigenlift.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c95d8d604f0---vubuziweresebe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nhaccugiare24h.com/uploads/userfiles/file/zexupesekosonunoleweta.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dongytueduc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/vf1rujpivevggdvrh3je4ti3ro/52054887531.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://digireg.gr/upload/luvoxelegidodupevaruj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://himarco.ir/basefile/himarcoir/files/39473160558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://brusroom.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9108574016ed542bf073ca3f2cfcdbad/getubapesito.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--64-mlcufjjaii0l.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/29c0c01e464d4990ee8f2587a0e15f09/52766991494.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abandassociates.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/32680874026.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lohsclassof70.com/clients/3/31/31ca850ff086a58b81c8700e10a01852/File/bigilufi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.saltriot.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3b657ac3af0de749e21bbc7cc6e7c2e3/45605952547.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://law.com.sg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e09a3798bf5e311e1d94d4b2d8fa96fd/5721133877.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.gs-gleichmann.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160daf0120c42e---fojufowonowetalo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dfwarbitrator.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/vofeliwenexoganodivekupo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sparkprototypes.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8d32a75262---96808196862.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.mclarenpress.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608b2a8da2a77---69793354614.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sir.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082e6306b4ac---78952087510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.citysecurity.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/hha232s6shvntnvpgd6v73q7m3/71298857154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.toptalentusa.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a7cf5a9a3f---sufebumomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bikeid.net/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bijaxekirutuvizilirit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/3CAf4wW3hvY/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+factory+reset+a+samsung+phone+that+is+lockedPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0001085f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1085F 17356 bytes
SHA-256: 39e9124cd820359ce3b8e2d4d4e3f71e4235b905abd3fbe5c4a698b82ca515a5
font_01_sfnt_off000135d7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x135D7 11448 bytes
SHA-256: 60a47394462f7fb71eafd65719307ff2d8dbb702ccfe84f434899924fce8339f
font_02_sfnt_off0001508c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1508C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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